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Critical Reflections on the Politics of Need, Robertson 1998:

The objectivity - and, therefore, irrefutability - of human needs, based on a scientific theory of human nature as fundamental and given, means that for Marx "needs represent both a teleological imperative and a motivational mechanism" (Springborg, 1981, p. 2). The pursuit of social justice is, thus, rendered scientific and no longer has to rely for its justification on ethical systems. Marx viewed ethical systems as always embedded in bourgeois morality, a morality which perpetuates the status quo in terms of an unequal distribution of social goods, both material and non-material (Lukes, 1985). For Marx, it is the unfolding of "truly human needs" which provides the impetus for the necessary and historical progression of industrial society from capitalism through socialism to communism and, hence, greater social justice.

This brings us to another dilemma, for to suggest that there exists "true" human needs is also to suggest that there exists human needs which are not true. While a fuller discussion of the centuries old debate over true vs. false needs is beyond the scope of this paper, for the purposes of the ensuing discussion one issue emerging from this debate will be very briefly highlighted. Proponents of the twentieth century doctrine of false needs (for example, Fromm, 1947; Maslow, 1954; Marcuse, 1972; Sartre, 1974; Illich, 1977, 1978) argue that the inculcation of ever-expanding false needs under capitalism has produced a new kind of person, one with a "willing compliance as an insatiable consumer" (Springborg, 1981, p. 6). Moreover, it has been argued that Marx's original notion of "commodity fetishism" has been replaced in the late twentieth century with a "services fetishism", with its even greater potential for an ever-expanding repertoire of false needs (Illich, 1977).

In contrast, Springborg argues that the doctrine of false needs not only oversimplifies the articulation of what human needs are, but also makes the project of meeting them seem almost futile, for "the doctrine denies the ethical character of [social] problems and puts their appropriate solution further out of reach... therefore beyond the rational scrutiny and control or responsibility, of the individual" (Springborg, 1981, p. 250). In addition, as I shall argue later, it takes the problem of human need out of the social and political realm and, therefore, beyond the community.